We investigate the incentives of rms owners to commit voluntarily to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market. The socially responsible attributes attached to products are considered as credence goods, with consumers forming expectations about their existence and level. We show that hiring an individually socially responsible CEO and delegating to him the CSR e¤ort and market decisions acts as a commitment device for the rm s owners and credibly signals to consumers that the rm will undertake the missioned CSR activities. We also nd that CSR activities are welfare enhancing for consumers and rms and thus, they should be encouraged.
Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR hereafter), a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on voluntary basis (European Commission, 2001 , has received recently increased attention from business, consumers, academics and policy makers. This has led many rms to account for the social consequences of their activities, making considerable e¤orts to become, or at least to appear as, socially responsible. 1 At the same time, the promotion of CSRs is a top priority in the policy agenda for sustainable development in many countries. 2 The above raise important issues for corporate strategy and public policy. To address the above questions, we consider a market with two large publicly traded rms, where each rm s owners have the option to follow a doing well by doing good strategy (Benabou and Tirole, 2010) , through their rms engagement in CSR activities, in order to meet the corresponding preferences of socially conscious consumers. This strategy can be represented in the rm s mission picked by its owners (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; . Porter and Cramer (2002; distinguish two types of CSR activities: (i) philanthropy oriented donations, and (ii) investments in production technologies and business processes, along the value chain, in favor of the rm s stakeholders. We restrict our attention to the latter type, as owners care about their rms involvement in socially responsible actions (i.e., a warm glow ), instead of donating to governments or other philanthropic intermediaries (Benabou and Tirole, 2010) . CSR activities of the latter type are described by Brisley et al. (2011) as actions to reduce the societal and ecological footprint of rms, through the incorporation of their stakeholders objectives in the corporate value chain. Such programs contain the improvement of employees health and safety, the support of local suppliers, the reduction of emissions of pollutants and the use of environmentally friendly inputs. CSR activities of this type, and the respective socially responsible (SR henceforth) attributes attached to products, are di¢cult -if not impossible -to be observed by consumers, even after consumption. Consumers can only form expectations about their existence and level. We thus treat these SR attributes as a credence good. 4 Firms products combine horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation aspects (Häckner, 2000; Garella and Petrakis, 2008 ). The latter is related to rms CSR activities that socially conscious consumers perceive as a quality improvement (Manasakis et al., 2013) . Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their social consciousness and have di¤erential valuations for the products SR aspects. 5 The credence aspect of the rms CSR activities generates an adverse selection problem implying a rm s incentives to cheat consumers and avoid any spending on costly CSR activities. 6 To avoid the failure of the SR related goods market, there is need for an information disclosure mechanism to credibly signal the rms CSR e¤orts to consumers. We argue that this mechanism can be contracted whithin a corporate governance charter. More speci cally, 4 Such attributes contain the conditions under which a product is produced, including externalities associated with production (e.g. pollution) as well as hidden hazards associated with consumption of the product (Calveras and Ganuza, 2010) . 5 Widespread evidence from manufacturing industries (Elfenbein and McManus, 2007) , tourism services (Blanco et al., 2009 ) and agricultural production (Plastina and Arnould, 2007; Becchetti and Costantino, 2006) , suggests that consumers express a willingness to pay a premium for goods and services produced by SR rms. 6 It is evident that rms consistently try to convince consumers about their CSR activities, via advertising them and publishing CSR reports . However, these e¤orts are not always trustworthy (Klein, 1999) and create considerable doubts to consumers about the rms commitment to CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2002) .
following Besley and Ghatak (2007) , we argue that the rm will undertake the missioned CSR activities, only if there is a binding contract to an agent who faces ex-post reputational penalties for cheating consumers. Therefore, if a rm s owners decide to undertake the missioned CSR activities, they hire an individually (in the terminology of Benabou and Tirole, 2010) socially responsible CEO ( manager hereafter) and delegate to him the rm s CSR activities and market decisions. 7;8 The hired manager then, serves as the self-commitment device for this rm s owners. We further consider that potential managers take on a continuum of attitudes towards CSR activities. In line with Miller and Pazgal (2001 , we argue that each manager is committed to behaving in a certain manner by virtue of his personality type and that rms owners select managers whose attitude t to their own competitive goals.
Each manager s attitude is captured by his type that is re ected on his curriculum of past SR activities that are common knowledge. A SR manager s objective consists of the rm s pro ts plus the extra intrinsic utility derived by her engagement in CSR activities.
Our main nding is that in equilibrium, a rm s owners engage in CSR activities in order to meet the corresponding demand by socially conscious consumers. Therefore, by hiring a SR manager and delegating to him the CSR e¤ort and output decisions, owners strategically (Baron, 2001 ) exploit the manager s SR attitude and signal to consumers that the missioned CSR activities will be undertaken. In turn, consumers increase their willingness to pay for this rm s product which then obtains a competitive advantage in the market and increases its pro ts. In this context, we identify the di¤erential impact that consumers social consciousness has on rms owners and managers behavior. As the average consumer type becomes more socially conscious, rms owners hire less SR managers because a more socially conscious population has (on average) higher willingness to pay for the rm s good per unit of CSR e¤ort undertaken. The latter implies a higher mark-up for the rm and allows its owners to save on CSR costs by hiring a less SR manager. However, as the average consumer s social 7 Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010, p. 456) argue that If corporate owners have altruistic preferences for the social welfare they will commission managers to run the rm in a philanthropic manner . Besley and Ghatak (2005) support the view that attracting individuals committed to prosocial behaviors can be a strategy for a CSR rm wishing to make a credible commitment to CSR; and Benabou and Tirole (2010, p. 10) argue for delegated philanthropy . 8 consciousness increases, the hired manager s utility increases on the level of CSR activities and output.
We also nd that increased consumers willingness to pay for CSR shall cause output, price and pro ts of a SR rm to be higher than the respective ones of a rm not undertaking CSR activities. The intuition goes as follows. Since the SR manager s welfare consists of the rm s pro ts plus the extra utility from engaging in CSR activities, this manager turns out to be more aggressive than a non-SR manager in the quantity setting game, enjoying a higher extra utility and increasing the rm s pro ts. At the same time, as consumers are willing to pay relatively more for the SR rm s product, its price is relatively higher. Yet, the SR manager s extra utility through his CSR activities, increase the rm s unit and overall cost. However, this negative cost e¤ect is dominated and the SR rm s pro t is higher than the respective of a rm s not undertaking CSR activities.
From a welfare point of view, the existence of a fraction of socially conscious consumers that are willing to pay a higher amount for CSR is welfare increasing. In particular, we nd that CSR activities by rms in order to meet the corresponding preferences by consumers, increase consumers surplus and social welfare, implying that CSR is welfare enhancing and should be encouraged, e.g. by raising consumers awareness regarding social and environmental issues.
We also nd that as the goods become less di¤erentiated, and market competition becomes ercer, consumers surplus and social welfare decrease because the increase in the equilibrium CSR e¤orts is dominated by the decrease in rms pro ts and consumers surplus. Our analysis further suggests that policy makers should promote the inclusion of managerial contracts over CSR activities and remuneration on corporate governance charters. This can be a credible information disclosure mechanism signalling to consumers that a rm s missioned CSR e¤orts will be materialized.
We also consider an industry with N > 2 rms producing di¤erentiated products. Interestingly, we nd that when the number of rms is relatively small, i.e., competition is not too erce, the positive revenue increase e¤ect of CSR dominates its negative cost e¤ect and owners decision to hire more SR managers increases pro ts. The opposite reasoning applies in highly competitive industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we place our paper within the relevant literature. In Section 3, we present the basic model and the benchmark cases. In Section 4 we investigate rms owners incentives to hire SR managers and Section 5 includes a welfare analysis. In Section 6 we consider the N -rm case and in Section 7 a number of extensions of the basic model are brie y discussed. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Related literature and contribution
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the literature studying rms CSR activities in oligopolistic markets. Closer in spirit to our paper is García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2009). Under full information, where CSR is a vertical di¤erentiation strategy entailing a xed cost, they study the e¤ects of exogenous changes in consumers willingness to pay for SR products on market structure, CSR e¤orts and social welfare. We depart from this paper since we classify CSR activities as a credence good entailing a variable unit cost. Moreover, we argue that for a certain consumers willingness to pay for SR products, it is the intensity of competition, captured by the degree of product di¤erentiation and the number of rms in the industry, and the types of managers hired that drive the market and Kopel and Brand (2012) , in a homogeneous duopoly, study rms incentives for CSR activities under full information and homogeneous consumers attitudes towards CSR. A SR rm maximizes its pro t plus a share of consumers surplus, with CSR e¤orts inducing no additional costs to the rms. We contribute to this literature in various ways: First, by assuming heterogeneous consumers regarding their attitudes towards CSR. Second, by focusing on the credence aspect of CSR and the respective imperfect information. We also consider that CSR e¤ort levels increase, at an increasing rate, a rm s unitary costs and examine how does the intensity of market competition a¤ects market and societal outcomes.
Another line of research o¤ers a contracting approach to CSR. Besley and Ghatak (2007) argue that a rm s opportunism to cheat on CSR promises can be overcome only if there is a binding contract to an agent who faces ex-post reputational/legal penalties for cheating consumers. In a principal-agent context, Besley and Ghatak (2005) argue that the principal can use a certain mission to incentivize an intrinsically motivated agent; and Baron (2008) studies how investors shape the managers incentives, through compensation contracts including both pro t and social performance. We contribute to this strand of the literature by considering how the use of managerial contracts, linking rms performance with managers individual prosocial concerns, can be used by rms owners as a commitment device to overcome the adverse selection problem caused by the credence aspects of CSR activities to consumers.
The Model
We consider a market that consists of two publicly traded rms, denoted by i, j = 1, 2, i = j.
The objective of each rm s owners -shareholders is to maximize own pro ts. In order to attain this objective, they have the option to follow a doing well by doing good strategy through their rm s engagement in CSR activities along the value chain (Porter and Kramer, 2002; . This strategy can be represented in the rm s mission picked by its owners (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; .
Each rm produces one brand of a di¤erentiated good. On the demand side, there is a unit mass of consumers with identical preferences on the physical characteristics of the two goods.
Yet, consumers are heterogeneous regarding their valuation of the rms CSR activities. In particular, following Häckner (2000) and Manasakis et al. (2013) , the utility function of the -type consumer is: Maximization of U ( ) with respect to x i ( ) and x j ( ) gives the -type consumer s (inverse) demand functions:
p i is the price of rm i s product. By inverting (2) we obtain the -type consumer s demand function:
The price of the composite good has been normalized to unity. By integrating (3) with respect to , we get rm i s demand function:
By inverting (4), rm i s inverse demand function is:
Observe that p i (q i ; q j ) is positively related to the average consumer type and the consumers expectations over rm i s CSR e¤ort level s e i . We assume that rms are endowed with identical constant returns to scale production technologies. Firm i s total cost is given by
We further consider that a higher CSR e¤ort level increases, at an increasing rate, rm i s marginal (and unitary) costs. 9 In the sequel we will make the following assumption that guarantees interior solutions in all cases.
Assumption 1 c(a c)
2 Assumption 1 requires that the marginal production cost c, even when rm i undertakes zero CSR e¤orts is neither too low nor too high. Firm i s pro ts are expressed as:
In this context, assuming that all aggregate demand and production parameters are common knowledge, an adverse selection problem may arise: Once consumers expectations over rm i s CSR e¤ort level are full led (s e i = s i ), they increase their willingness to pay for rm i s product. Yet, given the credence aspect of the CSR e¤orts, rm i has incentives to cheat consumers and avoid any spending on CSR activities. Consumers anticipate rm i s incentives to cheat them and rationally believe that there will be zero CSR activities (s e i = 0). Firm i, in turn, spends zero on CSR in equilibrium (s e i = s i = 0). Following Besley and Ghatak (2007), we consider that this adverse selection problem can be solved with a binding contract to an agent who faces ex-post reputational penalties for cheating consumers. We thus consider that if rm i s owners decide to undertake any CSR e¤ort, they hire a socially responsible CEO -manager and delegate to him the rm s CSR activities and market decisions. The hired manager then serves as a self-commitment device for rm i s owners and credibly signals to consumers that the rm will undertake the missioned CSR activities.
In this context, potential managers take on a continuum of attitudes towards CSR activities which is captured by their type t. Each manager s attitude is re ected on his curriculum of past SR activities that are common knowledge and thus observable by all rms owners and consumers. Since each manager is committed to behaving in a certain manner towards CSR, by virtue of his personality type (Miller and Pazgal, 2001; ), rm i s owners, by hiring a speci c t i -type of manager, commit to a certain entrepreneurial attitude towards CSR. A manager of type t i > 0 has the following objective function:
Letting i = t i c , note that a i -type of manager derives utility not only from rm i s pro ts but also through his own CSR activities within the rm. Following Benabou and Tirole (2006), Calveras et al. (2006) and Baron et al. (2008) , this extra utility has its source at intrinsic, image and reputational incentives. Manager i s extra personal utility increases, at an increasing rate, with rm i s CSR activities per unit of its output. Owners o¤er to their risk neutral managers take it or leave it incentive contracts. We assume, however, that these contracts cannot touch upon the extra personal utility that the managers obtain from the CSR activities. This, in turn, implies that rm i s owners ask from their manager a franchise fee equal to i and make the manager residual claimant of rm i s net pro ts. 10 
The Sequence of Moves
We consider a three-stage game. In the rst stage, rms owners, simultaneously and independently, decide whether their rms will undertake CSR activities or not. If rm i s owners decide to undertake CSR activities (s i > 0), they hire a SR manager of type i > 0 and delegate to him the CSR e¤ort and output decisions. 11 If instead, they decide not to undertake CSR activities (s i = 0), they hire a manager who is publicly known to have no prosocial concerns ( i = 0) and delegate to him the output decision. Technically speaking, this is identical to the case where the output decision is taken by the rm s owners. In the second stage, if the hired manager is of i > 0, he sets the rm i s CSR e¤ort and output level. 12 If instead, the hired manager is of i = 0, he sets the output level. In the last stage, consumers form beliefs about the rms CSR e¤orts, based upon the observed types of managers hired and the rms output levels, and then they purchase quantities of the two goods accordingly.
Benchmark case: No CSR Activities
Consider the case where both rms owners decide not to undertake CSR activities, i.e., each 2+ ; and C = (q C ) 2 respectively. Since all consumers have identical preferences over the physical characteristics of the two goods and there is a unit mass of them in the population, it turns out that each consumer buys a quantity x C = q C from each good. Then, consumers surplus and social welfare are given by
Benchmark case: Full Information
Next, consider that rms CSR activities are observable by consumers, i.e., they are classi ed as a search good. Hence, no rm s owners need to hire a manager of type i > 0. Instead, 1 1 Hiring a manager whose type is not publicly observable would induce an informational problem. This problem could be solved via certi cation (Cason and Gangadharan, 2002) , which acts as an information disclosure mechanism to credibly signal a manager s type i to consumers. 1 2 The decisions over CSR e¤ort and output are taken in the same stage because we assume that a manager s CSR activities are not observable by the rival manager. 
and F I = (q F I ) 2 . Note that these outcomes are higher than the respective under no CSR activities. Replacing the above on (1), we obtain consumers surplus and social welfare,
(1+ ) 2 var( ) which are also higher than the respective ones under no CSR activities. 13 
Equilibrium Incentives for CSR Activities
We proceed our analysis by assuming that both rms owners decide that their rms will undertake CSR activities (Universal CSR). Hence, each rm s owners hire a manager of type i > 0 and delegate to him the CSR e¤ort and output decisions. We then ask whether this is an equilibrium con guration.
In the last stage of the game, consumers, before making their purchasing decisions, form beliefs about the rms CSR e¤ort levels (s e i ; s e j ), based upon the information that they possess: the hired managers types ( i j ) and the rms output levels (q i ; q j ). As we will see below, consumers are able to infer the equilibrium values (s i ; s j ) by inverting the managers strategies.
In the second stage, managers anticipate that consumers will form correct expectations about their CSR e¤orts (s e i = s i ; i = 1; 2). Then, manager i chooses s i and q i to maximize his utility:
The rst order conditions of (8) give manager i s reaction functions for CSR e¤ort and output, respectively:
Consumers, knowing i , can infer s i from (9). They are also able to verify from (10) whether s i ; i = 1; 2 is consistent with the hired managers types ( i j ) and the rms output levels (q i ; q j ). If they turn out to be consistent, then s e i = s i . Otherwise, we specify that consumers expect that rm i s CSR e¤ort is null, i.e., s e i = s i = 0: 14 By substituting (9) into (10), the output reaction function R q i (:) as a function of q j and i alone, is:
Comparing R q i (q j i ) with the benchmark case with no CSR activities R C i (q j ), we observe that the former has an additional positive term, i.e., R q i (q j i ) shifts outwards. Hence, each rm s owners, by hiring a socially responsible manager, commit to a more aggressive behavior in the output market. Moreover, since R q i (q j i ) is increasing in i , rm i s owners commitment in more aggressive behavior is more pronounced here, as compared to the respective under full information. Solving the system of rst order conditions, the equilibrium CSR e¤ort and output levels are:
Clearly, the more socially responsible rm i s manager is (higher i ), the higher is rm i s CSR e¤ort. Further, rm i s output increases with i , while it decreases with j , because rm i s manager enjoys a higher extra utility per unit of output produced by rm i, namely i c
While, when the rival manager is of a higher j -type and sets thus a higher output for rm j, rm i s manager optimally reacts by reducing rm i s output.
In the rst stage, rm i s owners choose the type i of manager to hire, in order to maximize their pro ts:
Taking the rst order condition of (13), and exploiting symmetry, the type of manager to be hired in equilibrium is:
where
It can be checked that 0 < 2=7, > 0 and 0 as 0 for all permissible values of m. 16 Ideally, rms owners would prefer to hire the least possible SR type of managers and use them exclusively as signaling devices, in order to reach as close as possible to their most preferred outcome (i.e., the outcome under full information in which rms CSR activities are observable by consumers). In the latter case, rms owners would save on CSR costs and increase pro ts. Yet, since CSR e¤orts are unobservable, rms owners are obliged to hire SR managers who are not strict pro t-maximizers. The more SR a rm s manager is, the farther away from strict pro t-maximization, i.e., from full information pro ts, the rm ends up. Indeed, when the goods are almost independent ( 0), each rm s owners hire the least SR manager in order to credibly signal to consumers the rm s missioned CSR activities.
Substituting into (13), (12), (4) and (6) we obtain the equilibrium CSR e¤ort, output, price and pro ts, respectively:
Finally, ( ) is an equilibrium con guration only if no rm s owners have incentives to deviate by not hiring a manager of type . Let rm j s owners stick to hiring a -type manager. Do rm i s owners have incentives to deviate by hiring a manager with no prosocial 1 6 Note that m( a ; Regarding the type of managers that rms owners hire in equilibrium, it can be checked from (14) that > 0, i.e., the less di¤erentiated the goods are (higher ), the more SR are the managers hired. Intuitively, as increases, the brands sold in the market become closer substitutes, i.e., market competition becomes ercer, and each rm s owners have to hire a more SR manager in order to gain competitive advantage in the market. Moreover, rms owners hire less SR managers as the average consumer type becomes more socially conscious (higher ). Interestingly, a population with higher has (on average) higher willingness to pay for rm i s good, per unit of CSR e¤ort undertaken by this rm. This implies a higher mark-up for rm i and allows its owners to save on CSR costs by hiring a less SR manager. Note also that, the larger the market size is (higher a), the more rentable is a rm s CSR activity, and thus rms owners hire more SR managers. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2 Firms owners hire more SR managers (higher ) when: (i) the goods are less di¤erentiated and the market competition becomes ercer (higher ); (ii) the average consumer type is less socially conscious (lower ); (iii) the market size is larger (higher a).
Now from (15) it can be checked that ds > 0, > 0 and dq dc < 0. As expected, when the goods become less di¤erentiated, the more SR hired managers undertake higher CSR e¤ort levels. Further, the equilibrium CSR e¤ort and output increase with the degree of social consciousness of the average consumer type , as well as with the e¢ciency of the CSR (and output) production technology (captured by a lower c). The intuition goes as follows. The more socially conscious the average consumer is, the higher is the population s willingness to pay and demand for CSR related products. Although the rm s owners hire a less SR manager (Proposition 2), the manager spends more on CSR activities and sets a higher level of output. This implies increased production costs that tend to decrease the rm s pro ts and subsequently, the manager s utility. On the other hand, the manager bene ts both from the rm s higher revenues (due to the increased demand) and the extra utility of his CSR e¤ort and output chosen. The latter e¤ects dominate the negative cost e¤ect and CSR e¤ort and output increase as increases. An increase in the the e¢ciency of the production technology, i.e., a reduction in c has similar e¤ects. Finally, it can be checked from (17) that equilibrium pro ts follow a similar pattern, i.e. they increase with and decrease with c. Our ndings are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) Equilibrium CSR e¤ort increases when the goods are less di¤erentiated and the market competition becomes ercer (higher ). (ii) Equilibrium CSR e¤ort, output and pro ts increase when the average consumer type is more socially conscious (higher ), as well as when the CSR production technology is more e¢cient (lower c).
Proposition 3 leads to a number of testable hypotheses on the performance e¤ects of CSR activities . As mentioned in the Introduction, the empirical literature on this issue is so far inconclusive and thus further investigation is needed on this issue.
We next compare the equilibrium outcomes of Universal CSR with the respective ones in the two benchmark cases. The following observations are in order. First, s > s F I ; q > q C and q > q F I always hold. Regarding CSR e¤ort levels, recall that under unobservable SR attributes, the presence of SR managers, deriving utility via their own CSR activities, leads to higher CSR e¤ort as compared to the full information scenario where managers are of type i = 0. Regarding output levels, these ndings are rationalized by the SR managers relative aggressiveness during output setting (see the analysis of (11)). Second, since consumers willingness to pay for CSR related products increases as rms undertake higher CSR e¤orts, it is clear that p > p C and p > p F I (see (5)). Third, > C always holds. Intuitively, rms pro ts are a¤ected by three factors. First, CSR activities increase the CSR related products demand and revenues. Second, since managers gain an extra utility via their CSR activities, they exert pressure for higher CSR e¤ort, increasing thus the rms unit and overall costs.
Third, higher output by both managers intensi es market competition, decreasing thus rms pro ts. It turns out that the rst e¤ect dominates and pro ts are higher under Universal CSR.
In contrast, < F I always holds. Intuitively, in the full information case, managers are relatively less aggressive, in terms of the CSR e¤ort and output levels set, implying that competition is relatively softer, resulting in relatively higher rms pro ts. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4 (i) Equilibrium output, price and pro ts are higher under Universal CSR
rather than when no CSR activities are undertaken.
(ii) Equilibrium CSR e¤ort, output and price are higher, while pro ts are lower, under
Universal CSR rather than under full information.
Welfare Analysis
In this section we investigate the welfare e¤ects of rms CSR activities. Social welfare is de ned as the sum of consumers surplus and rms pro ts. 17 The -type consumer s surplus is:
In equilibrium, due to symmetry,
After some manipulations,
and using x ( ), it becomes:
because the second term is zero and the third term is proportional to var( ). The last inequality holds due to var( ) 0 (with the equality holding only for degenerate distributions f ( ) = for all ). One can easily check that CS > CS C , because s > 0 and q > q C ; and CS > CS F I because s > s F I and q > q F I aways hold.
Under Universal CSR, social welfare is SW = CS . Since both rms pro ts (Proposition 4) and CS are higher in this case, rather than under no CSR activities, SW is higher too. Further, as we have seen, under Universal CSR, rms pro ts are lower, while CS is higher, than the respective ones under full information. It turns out that the increase in CS more than compensates for the decrease in the rms pro ts and SW under Universal CSR is higher than under full information. 18 Surprisingly, certi cation of CSR activities (Bottega and De Freitas, 2009) guaranteeing full information, would make SR managers to be redundant.
In turn, this would decrease CS and SW .
Finally, since s , q and increase with and decrease with c, it is easy to see that CS and T W follow the same pattern. Note also that as increases, the increase in s is dominated by the decrease in and CS . As a consequence, T W decreases with .
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the variance of social consciousness in the population increases both the CS and SW . This is due to the fact that a more heterogeneous consumer population makes more dissimilar purchasing decisions. The utility gain of the highly conscious consumers overcompensates for the utility loss of the low consciousness consumers and CS is higher than under a more homogeneous population.
The following Proposition summarizes: (ii) increase when the average consumer type is more socially conscious (higher ) and when the e¢ciency of CSR production technology is higher (lower c).
(iii) decrease when the goods are less di¤erentiated and the market competition becomes ercer (higher ).
Two further observations are in order. First, there is alignment of market and social incentives for CSR activities. Firms, by engaging in CSR activities, obtain higher pro ts due to consumers increased willingness to pay for their products. At the same time, consumers surplus increases because rms are satisfying their demand for SR products. Second, Proposition 5 suggests that policy makers should take measures to promote CSR activities, e.g., by raising consumers awareness (increasing ) via informational campaigns. This can play an important role in providing incentives for responsible production and responsible business behavior. Consumers are expected to exercise critical choice and encourage good products and good companies (European Commission, 2006) . This policy suggestion is in partial accordance to García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2009), who support that public spending on increasing consumers willingness to pay for CSR shall be welfare enhancing, only if increasing consumers willingness to pay for CSR does not change the market structure. 19 Our analysis further suggests that policy makers should promote the inclusion of managerial contracts over CSR activities and remuneration on corporate governance charters. This can be a credible information disclosure mechanism signalling to consumers that a rm s missioned CSR e¤orts will be materialized.
The N -rm case
We now consider an industry with N > 2 rms. Each rm i; i = 1; 2; ::; N faces an inverse demand function p i = a + i q i i , where Q i = j=i q j and is the product substitutability between any pair of goods. All other parameters as well as the timing of the game are as in the duopoly case. 20 In this case, the objective function of type-i manager is:
Yet, it is worth mentioning that according to García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2009), if increasing consumers environmental consciousness alters the market structure, welfare may decrease. Therefore, their policy recommendation, is not always for environmental consciousness campaigns.
2 0 The inverse demand functions are derived by aggregating individual demand functions of an heterogeneous, in terms of willingness to pay for rms CSR performance population, as in Section 3.1. In particular, each type consumer has a utility function which is a generalization of (1):
respect to s i and q i , and solving the system of rst order conditions, gives the equilibrium CSR e¤ort and quantity level in the second stage of the game: 
The expression of is too long to be included in the main text and is available from the authors upon request.
Extensions-Discussion
In this section we consider a number of modi cations of the basic model in order to brie y discuss the robustness of our main results. 22 
Timing of the Game
Consider the case where manager i s CSR activities are observable by manager j before taking the output decisions. We undertake this task by considering a four-stage game. Given the rms owners decisions in the rst stage, in the second stage, manager i chooses and publicly announces the level of rm i s CSR e¤ort. In the third stage, managers compete in quantities. In the fourth stage, consumers form beliefs about the rms CSR e¤orts and make their purchasing decisions. Interestingly, all our results remain unaltered under this alternative scenario. This happens because it is the hired manager i s type that signals to consumers rm i s owners commitment to a certain entrepreneurial attitude towards CSR.
Types of Decisions Delegated
Consider the case where the CSR e¤ort decision is delegated to a CSR divisional manager while the output decision is left to a production manager. 23 We undertake this task with a modi ed four-stage game. In the rst stage, if a rm s owners decide to undertake CSR activities, they hire a CSR divisional manager of i , which is common knowledge, and delegate to him the CSR e¤ort decision alone. In the second stage, SR divisional managers choose and publicly announce the rms CSR e¤orts, s i . In the third stage, production managers compete in quantities and in the fourth stage, consumers form beliefs about the rms CSR e¤orts and make their purchasing decisions. We nd that in equilibrium, the CSR divisional managers are less SR and the CSR e¤orts they undertake are lower than the respective ones in the basic model, i.e. and s < s . Intuitively, since consumers are aware that the quantity levels have been set not by socially responsible CEOs but from production managers, they realize that the link between CSR e¤orts and quantities is relatively weak. 24 As a consequence, they 2 2 For each extension discussed below, the detailed analysis is available from the authors upon request. 2 3 According to Benabou and Tirole (2010) , nominating someone with a good external reputation as a Corporate Sustainability O¢cer and delegating to her the rm s CSR activities, is an increasingly popular practice. 2 4 In particular, the quantities produced are not a proof to SR consumers that the CSR divisional managers have taken action and really a¤ect the rms CSR activities, since the latter also a¤ect quantities.
form relatively lower expectations about the rms CSR activities and their willingness to pay for the CSR related products is lower too. Firms owners are aware of this and optimally respond by hiring relatively less SR divisional managers, in order to save on CSR costs.
Managerial Objective Functions
In the basic model we have assumed that the manager s objective function is convex in CSR 
Bertrand Competition
Consider the case where managers compete in prices. Our results remain qualitatively robust under this scenario too. In the present case we nd that the rms owners will hire the least possible SR managers, i.e., B = , with > 0 but close to zero. Intuitively, since competition in prices is too erce, rms owners hire managers with the least CSR type in order to keep competition as soft as possible. Hence, they strategically use managers only as signaling devices. A direct consequence is that the CSR e¤orts undertaken under Bertrand competition are lower than the respective ones under Cournot competition.
Alternative Managerial Contracts
On a di¤erent ground, suppose that managers do not have social responsibility consciousness per se, but they can undertake the missioned CSR activities, only if they are o¤ered by the rms owners an appropriate incentive contract, in the spirit of Fershtman and Judd (1987) , which is observable by consumers. This is in the spirit of Bhattacharyaa and Dugar (2012) who present evidence according to which, for given monetary earnings, inducing higher status and social recognition incentives (e.g., image and reputation) can cause managers to invest higher levels of e¤ort. In this scenario, all our results remain qualitatively robust.
Concluding remarks
The present paper has been motivated by the fact that rms CSR activities are voluntary, products SR attributes are unobservable by consumers, who perceive them as quality improvements and express a relatively increased willingness to pay for them. In this context, the present paper links individual and corporate social responsibility and studies rms owners incentives to commit to CSR activities, in a corporate governance context.
Our core argument is that, since consumers willingness to pay for CSR products is relatively increased, each rm has incentives to strategically engage in such activities in order to obtain a competitive advantage in the market. Therefore, a rm s owners, by hiring an individually SR manager and delegating to him the rm s CSR activities and market decisions, strategically exploit the manager s SR attitude and signal to consumers that the missioned CSR activities will be undertaken. Hence, from a corporate governance point of view, the hired manager serves as the self-commitment device for this rm s owners and acts as an information disclosure mechanism for consumers. In turn, consumers increase their willingness to pay for this rm s product, which then obtains a competitive advantage in the market and increases its pro ts and the overall welfare. An apparently counterintuitive result is that as consumers become more socially conscious, rms owners hire less SR managers. Yet, this does not necessarily lead to less CSR activities by rms, since hired managers will increase their CSR spending with a more socially conscious population of consumers.
Two interesting directions for further research would be to investigate whether CSR is a way for rms to achieve a competitive advantage via reducing the market and reputational risks that they face (see, e.g., Heal, 2005) , as well as the case where successive CSR e¤orts lead to an accumulation of reputation for rms and managers. The latter would link our research to the literature approaching CSR from the Resource-Based Theory point of view (see, e.g.,
McWilliams and Siegel, 2011).
We also believe that our ndings may guide future empirical research on CSR with a number of testable hypotheses: First, CSR e¤ort increases when the goods are less di¤erentiated as well as when the market competition becomes ercer. Second, output, price and pro ts of rms undertaking CSR activities are higher than the respective of rms not undertaking. Third, the overall CSR e¤orts undertaken in an industry increase under an intermediate intensity of competition, captured by the number of rms in the industry, while they decrease as the number of rms further increases.
